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The European Union TRIPS over the U.S.
Constitution: Can The First Amendment
Save the Bologna That Has a First Name?
Harry N. Niska*
Indeed your bologna has a first name - it's O-S-C-A-R - but
risks losing its most important name. Lunch meats called bolo-
gna or baloney get the name from mortadella bologna, the
smooth, pink, steamed sausage made since the Renaissance in
Bologna, Italy. Time for Oscar Mayer and others to cut it out,
the EU says. 1
INTRODUCTION
During the failed World Trade Organization (WTO) negotia-
tions in Cancun in September 2003 the dispute between devel-
oped and developing countries regarding agriculture subsidies
drew most of the big headlines. However, there was another
major agricultural disagreement in Cancun. This one pitted the
European Union (EU) against several other major developed
countries, most prominently the United States. 2 One newspaper
leading up to Cancun predicted "[a] food fight of global propor-
tions" in which "[d]istinguished trade ministers from 146 na-
tions will be hurling Parmesan, Bologna and Chablis at one an-
* J.D. Candidate, 2005, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., 2002, Concordia
College. I would like to dedicate this article to my parents, for their amazing sup-
port even as I pursue a profession that was probably their last choice for me. I
would also like to thank Professor Chen for helping me choose the topic for this piece
and all the editors and staff members at the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade who
cleaned up after my mistakes. All remaining errors are my responsibility.
1. James Cox, What's in a Name?, USA TODAY, Sept. 9, 2003, at lB.
2. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 1; Thomas Fuller, California Chablis? No Such
Thing, Europeans Say, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2003, at C3; Carolyn Said, The Label
Police: Europeans are Getting Snippy About Foreigners Using Their Place Names for
Food, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 17, 2003, at I1; Daniel Schwammenthal & William Echik-
son, Europe Asserts Right to Name of 41 Products, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2003, at A6;
Katherine Skiba, EU Proposal has U.S. Cheesed: State May be Barred from Calling
Items Parmesan, Asiago, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 3, 2003, at A3.
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other."3 The EU made demands in the Cancun trade talks for
stronger international protection of geographical indications
(GIs) on several food products that they consider to be histori-
cally tied to specific regions of Europe. 4 Despite the lack of any
progress on this front at Cancun,5 the EU and Switzerland, an-
other supporter of the EU proposals, have pledged to push for-
ward with their demands in future talks. 6
Much has been made about the generic nature of many of
the names that the EU hopes to protect, such as bologna, cham-
pagne, chablis, mozzarella, and feta.7 This has frequently been
cited as a policy reason for U.S. opposition to the EU proposals.8
However, the vitally important constitutional ramifications that
would arise from the U.S. government complying with the pro-
posals by prohibiting producers who do not reside in certain
European regions from using certain non-misleading words to
describe their products have been neglected. 9 This Note at-
tempts to remedy that situation.
Part I of this Note will describe the situation as it exists to-
day. Part L.A will explore the current protections of GIs and the
proposals by the EU for stronger protections. Part I.B will lay
out the U.S. constitutional doctrine regarding the limitations on
the power of the U.S. government to make international agree-
ments and the current state of the First Amendment jurispru-
dence as it relates to regulation of GIs. Part II will describe the
legal implications of the EU proposals, and apply constitutional
3. See Said, supra note 2.
4. See supra note 2.
5. See Carol Emert, Politics, Body Parts, and Champagne, S.F. CHRON., Sept.
25, 2003, at D2 (describing the breakdown of WTO talks over the generic use of geo-
graphic names).
6. Fischer Signs Wines and Spirits Pact, EUROPE AGRIC., Sept. 26, 2003; Dr.
Franz Fischler, From Cancun: The Road Ahead for the Trade and Agricultural Nego-
tiations, at http://europe.eu.int/rapid/start (Sept. 16, 2003); See Jason Stein, Switzer-
land's Cheesemakers Try to Roll with Global Punches: One Company Combined Old
World Methods with Cheaper American Milk, WIS. ST. J., Sept. 21, 2003, at Al.
7. See infra notes 11-13, 27, 50-57, 66 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 11-13, 27, 50-57, 66 and accompanying text.
9. For example, the U.S. House Agriculture Committee held hearings to dis-
cuss the international negotiations regarding geographical indications on July 22,
2003. The Status of the World Trade Organization Negotiations on Agriculture:
Hearing Before the House Agricultural Committee, 108th Cong. 301-68 (2003) [here-
inafter Status of the World Trade Organization]. In the sixty-eight pages of docu-
ments published from those hearings, however, there is not one mention of the First
Amendment problems with the EU proposals, even though the witnesses at the
hearings were overwhelmingly opposed to those proposals. See id.
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principles to determine whether the United States could agree
without violating the U.S. Constitution. This Note concludes
that such proposals would not withstand constitutional scrutiny
when applied to labels that are no longer closely tied to geo-
graphical regions in the minds of U.S. consumers. It would be a
mistake to overlook constitutional limitations on the regulation
of GIs in international trade negotiations. If the international
community accepted the EU proposals, either international
trade or the U.S. Constitution would be threatened.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL LANDSCAPE REGARDING
PROTECTION OF GIS
A. CURRENT PROTECTIONS OF GIS
Europeans and Americans have long had drastically differ-
ent cultural views about whether certain food labels are con-
nected to certain regions.10 In the United States and many
other countries populated by European immigrants, many food
names that "Old World" Europeans consider tied to specific re-
gions have been used for quite some time for food made in the
"New World."11 Those labels are now often used to refer simply
to styles of foods rather than the specific place of origin of that
product.1 2 Most U.S. consumers do not usually expect the name
of the food to tell them where the food is from, and thus are not
fooled by many labels that Europeans might consider mislead-
10. Compare Jim Chen, A Sober Second Look at Appellations of Origin: How
the United States Will Crash France's Wine and Cheese Party, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 29 (1996), with Louis Lorvellec, You've Got to Fight for Your Right to Party: A
Response to Professor Chen, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 65 (1996).
11. See Status of the World Trade Organization, supra note 9, at 345 (state-
ment of Sarah F. Thorn, Director for International Trade at the Grocery Manufac-
turers of America); Lisa Carricaburu, WTO Forum Deciding Fate of Tooele Feta,
SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 14, 2003, at El (discussing the example of feta cheese in the
United States); Deborah Haynes, WTO Panel to Study Dispute by U.S., Australia
with EU over Home Grown Brands, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 2, 2003 (discuss-
ing similar views of feta cheese in Australia), Compare Jim Eagles, It's Time to
Fight Fire with Fire, NEW ZEALAND HERALD, Aug. 19, 2003 (arguing that cheddar
cheese is a generic label), with Said, supra note 2 (quoting a European official who
considers cheddar to be tied to a region of Great Britain).
12. See supra note 11.
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ing.13 This cultural difference has not prevented Europeans
from wanting to protect U.S. consumers from themselves. 14 Af-
ter all, the pecuniary interests of European farmers are at
stake. Because European countries have long made a conscious
effort to avoid agricultural economies of scale that have recently
characterized many other agricultural markets, 15 European gov-
ernments claim that their farmers need either massive subsi-
dies or stronger geographical indication protections to survive. 16
Franz Fischler, the EU's farm commissioner, asserts, "EU pro-
ducers are losing billions a year because non-European produc-
ers are free-riding on the reputation of European quality prod-
ucts." 17
GIs are not entirely unprotected in the status quo. Cur-
rently, there are no fewer than four international treaties that
address the issue.' 8 The most recent, and by far the most sig-
nificant, of these treaties is the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights of 1994 (TRIPS). 19 Three
previous attempts to establish international geographical indi-
cations regimes prior to TRIPS were: The Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property (1883),20 the Madrid
Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications
13. See Said, supra note 2 (discussing consumer attitudes regarding U.S. prod-
ucts called Parmesan cheese and Basmati rice); Jeffrey Sparshott, EU's Name Game
No Fun for U.S. Food Producers, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2003, at Al.
14. Cf. Lorvellec, supra note 10, at 72-77 (characterizing the predominant U.S.
attitude toward GIs as "the reign of the most ignorant consumers" and "the triumph
of dishonest manufacturers").
15. See Stein, supra note 6.
16. See Protecting Names, ECONOMIST, Aug. 2, 2003, at 49; Stein, supra note 6;
Bruce Stokes, Protecting French Cheese and Italian Prosciutto, NAT'L J., Aug. 9,
2003, at 2556; European Union, Intellectual Property: Why do Geographical Indica-
tions Matter to Us?, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/intell prop-
erty/arguen.htm (July 30, 2003) [hereinafter Geographical Indications].
17. See Cox, supra note 1.
18. See Stacy D. Goldberg, Comment, Who Will Raise the White Flag? The Bat.
tle Between the United States and the European Union over the Protection of Geo-
graphical Indications, 22 U. PA. J. INTL ECON. L. 107, 111-12 (2001).
19. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/27-trips.pdf (last vis-
ited Oct. 13, 2003) [hereinafter TRIPS].
20. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883,
as last revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at
http://clea.wipo.int/pdffiles/english/wo/wo02Oen.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2003) [here-
inafter Paris Convention].
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of Source on Goods (1891),21 and the Lisbon Agreement for the
Protection of Appellations of Origin and their International Reg-
istration (1958).22 All three of these earlier treaties were lim-
ited in their ability to achieve the goals currently expressed by
the EU. 23 TRIPS is more promising as it is part of the compre-
hensive WTO system and, as such, includes all members of the
WTO.24
The official WTO summary provides a concise explanation
of the relevant provisions respecting GIs:
[Tihe agreement lays down that all parties must provide means to pre-
vent the use of any indication which misleads the consumer as to the
origin of goods, and any use which would constitute an act of unfair
competition. A higher level of protection is provided for geographical
indications for wines and spirits, which are protected even where there
is no danger of [misleading consumers] as to the true origin. Excep-
tions are allowed for... generic terms .... Furthermore, provision is
made for further negotiations to establish a multilateral system of no-
tification and registration of geographical indications for wines.25
The U.S. government considers the exception for non-
21. Madrid Agreement for the Repression of False or Deceptive Indications of
Source of Goods, Apr. 14, 1891, 828 U.N.T.S. 389, available at http://www.wipo.intl
clea/docs/enlwo/wo032en.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2003) [hereinafter Madrid
Agreement].
22. Lisbon Agreement for the Protection of Appellations of Origin and their In-
ternational Registration, Oct. 31, 1958, as last revised Sept. 28, 1979, 923 U.N.T.S.
205, available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/woOl2en.htm (last visited Oct.
13, 2003) [hereinafter Lisbon Agreement].
23. The Paris Convention was limited in two ways: (1) it only applied to the
importation of goods and (2) it was effectively limited to examples of serious fraud,
not the use of arguably generic labels. See Goldberg, supra note 18, at 112-13.
While the United States is a signatory to the Paris Convention, it does not require
any regulation of domestic producers. See id. at 112. The Madrid Agreement created
stronger protection of GIs, including measures to prevent wine names from becom-
ing generic terms, but was limited by the small number of signatories. See id. at
113-14. Most notably, the United States has never signed the Madrid Agreement.
Id. The Lisbon Agreement also sets high standards for protecting GIs, including
prohibiting the use of indications with terms such as "like" or "style." See id. at 114-
15. However, like the Madrid Convention, the Lisbon Agreement is also limited by
the lack of United States membership. See id. at 114-15. Since the European Union
is now expressing serious concern about the use of labels that are considered generic
within the United States market, it is easy to see why none of these three treaties
offers a solution satisfactory to the EU. See Fuller, supra note 2.
24. See Goldberg, supra note 18, at 116.
25. WTO, A Summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/ursume.htm#nAgreement (last visited
Oct. 13, 2003).
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misleading labels (for all products other than wine and cheese)26
and the exception for generic terms 27 to be of vital importance. 28
The EU is considerably less enthusiastic about these excep-
tions. 29 As a result, it has generated some proposals that aim to
close these loopholes.
B. THE EU's PROPOSALS FOR STRENGTHENED PROTECTION OF GIs
Going into the WTO talks in Cancun, the EU laid out three
separate "objectives" for strengthening the international protec-
tion of GIs. 30 The first is the establishment of a "simple, cost-
effective system of world-wide registration for geographical indi-
cations."31 This is relatively uncontroversial because the TRIPS
agreement already calls for WTO members to negotiate the es-
tablishment of a system of notification and registration for GIs
for wines and spirits. 32 However, because the EU wants to ex-
pand this registry to food products beyond wine and spirits, this
first proposal still faces a fair amount of opposition by itself.33
The second EU objective is to extend the amount of protec-
tion that TRIPS provides so that "cheeses, rice and teas can en-
joy the benefit of not being copied by producers from other coun-
tries by simply indicating 'made in USA' or 'style of
Roquefort."' 34 The current TRIPS framework provides a differ-
ent level of protection for wines and spirits than for other prod-
ucts. 3 5 Other products need to be protected only if consumers
would be misled by use of a geographical label that suggests
26. See Status of the World Trade Organization, supra note 9, at 349-50
(statement of Jon Dudas, Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual
Property).
27. TRIPS, supra note 19, at 92; See Status of the World Trade Organization,
supra note 9, at 349-50 (statement of Jon Dudas, Deputy Under Secretary of Com-
merce for Intellectual Property).
28. See Status of the World Trade Organization, supra note 9, at 349-50 (2003)
(statement of Jon Dudas, Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual
Property).
29. See Geographical Indications, supra note 16.
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. See TRIPS, supra note 19, at 92; Status of the World Trade Organization,
supra note 9, at 360 (statement of James Clawson, International Trade Advisor,
Wine Institute).
33. See Status of the World Trade Organization, supra note 9, at 357-59
(statement of Thomas Suber, President, U.S. Dairy Export Council).
34. Geographical Indications, supra note 16.
35. See Status of the World Trade Organization, supra note 9, at 357 (state-
ment of Thomas Suber, President, U.S. Dairy Export Council).
[Vol. 13:2
TRIPS OVER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
that a product originated in a place other than its actual place of
origin.36 However, unless a particular label is "generic," wines
and spirits must be protected even if the actual place of origin is
clearly marked, the geographical indication is used in transla-
tion, or if the indication is accompanied by a term like "type" or
"style."37 Essentially, the EU wants to extend the absolute pro-
hibition against even non-misleading use of GIs beyond wines
and spirits to the entire sphere of products covered by TRIPS.38
The third EU objective is the most controversial. The first
two proposals ask for changes to the TRIPS Agreement, which
already deals with Gis. The third proposal pushes for amend-
ments to the Agreement on Agriculture, a WTO treaty that does
not currently include any provisions protecting GIs. 39 While the
introduction of this proposal into the agriculture discussions is
controversial in itself,40 the controversy extends beyond the pro-
cedural tactics used by the EU. The substantive provisions of
this proposal led three of the six witnesses at a recent congres-
sional hearing on the subject to identify this provision as "the
single most offensive element of the proposals."41
This third proposal is called the "claw-back" proposal be-
cause it is intended to withdraw geographic labels that have be-
come generic terms or have been trademarked in other coun-
tries.4 2 The EU hopes to do this by adding two definitions to
Article 1 of the Agreement on Agriculture. 43 "Geographical indi-
cation" would be defined as
an indication which identifies an agricultural good as originating in
the territory of a Member, or a region or locality in that territory,
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 358 ("The general rule ... requires protection against uses of geo-
graphic terms that are misleading or constitute an act of unfair competition. In
other words, the European Union wants the exception to swallow the general rule.").
39. Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS--RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/
englishldocs eflegal-e/14-ag.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2004) [hereinafter Agreement
on Agriculture].
40. See Status of the World Trade Organization, supra note 9, at 309 (state-
ment of Jon Dudas, Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property).
41. See id. at 332-33.
42. See, e.g., id. at 358 (statement of Thomas Suber, President, U.S. Dairy Ex-
port Council); Phony Baloney, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 1, 2003, at 10.
43. See Commission Proposal for Modalities in the WTO Agriculture Negotia-
tions, 9, at http://europa.eu.intlcomm/agriculture/externalwto/officdoclmod.pdf (Jan.
29, 2003).
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where a given quality, reputation or other characteristic of the good is
essentially attributable to its geographical origin and which is pro-
tected in the laws and regulations of that Member.
4 4
"Originating" would mean, "that an agricultural product is
produced or processed within the territory, region or locality of
the Member concerned." 45
The EU would also like to add the following language to Ar-
ticle 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture:
3. Members shall ensure protection of the geographical indications re-
ferred to in Annex W in accordance with the individual commitments
undertaken and included therein.
The protected names are exclusively reserved to the agricultural prod-
ucts originating in the place indicated by the geographical indication
in question and can no longer be used after the phase out period. Geo-
graphical indications not included in annex W will continue to benefit
from the protection provided for in Articles 22 and 23 of the TRIPs
Agreement.
Any use of indications protected by virtue of this Agreement for prod-
ucts originating in a geographical area other than the true place of ori-
gin shall be prohibited, even when:
the true origin of the product is indicated;
b) the geographical indication is used in translation;
c) the indications are accompanied by expressions such as "kind"
"type" "style" "imitation" "method" or the like.
Where indications protected by virtue of this Agreement are homony-
mous, protection shall be granted to each indication, provided it is tra-
ditionally and consistently used, its use for that purpose is regulated
by the country of origin, it does not falsely represent to the public that
the goods originate in another territory and consumers are not misled
as to the true origin of the product.
4 6
The EU proposal would then be completed with a list of spe-
cific terms that they would like protected in a new Annex of the
Agreement on Agriculture. 47 On August 28, 2003, the EU re-
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 9-10 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 16.
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leased a list of forty-one specific terms that they were proposing
should be included in this protected list.48 This list 49 contains
more than a few products that have raised loud protest from
U.S. food producers.5 0
Among the products that have drawn the most outrage are
champagne, 5 1 sherry,52 asiago,53 feta,5 4 mozzarella,5 5 parme-
san, 56 and perhaps the most amazing inclusion, bologna.57
While some of these names are not listed as such, the prohibi-
tion on using even translations of geographical terms 58 has the
effect of banning the use of these terms.5 9
The monetary stakes of the negotiations over these EU pro-
posals are extremely high. U.S. food producers, as well as other
food producers that do not reside in the preferred regions of
Europe, would be forced to re-brand their products and re-
48. See Cox, supra note 1; Schwammenthal & Echikson, supra note 2.
49. See Press Release, European Union, WTO Talks: EU Steps Up Bid for Bet-
ter Protection of Regional Quality Products, 3 (Aug. 28, 2003), at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start (last visited Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter WTO Talks].
The list includes the following wines and spirits: Beaujolais, Bordeaux, Bourgogne;
Chablis; Champagne; Chianti; Cognac; Grappa di Barolo, del Piemonte, di
Lombardia, del Trentino, del Friuli, del Veneto, dell'Alto Adige; Graves; Lieb-
frau(en)milch; Malaga; Marsala; Madeira; M6doc; Moselle; Ouzo; Porto; Rhin; Rioja;
Saint-Emilion; Sauternes; and Jerez/Xerez: Id. The list also contains the following
other products: Asiago, Azafrdn de la Mancha, Comt6, Feta, Fontina, Gorgonzola,
Grana Padano, Jijona y Turr6n de Alicante, Manchego, Mortadella Bologna, Mozza-
rella di Bufala Campana, Parmigiano Reggiano, Pecorino Romano, Prosciutto di
Parma, Prosciutto di San Daniele, Prosciutto Toscano, Queijo Sdo Jorge, Reblochon,
and Roquefort. Id.
50. See Cox, supra note 1; Said, supra note 2; Schwammenthal & Echikson, su-
pra note 2; Tom Webb, Wisconsin, Europe Butt Cheeseheads over Names, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS, Sept. 5, 2003, at Al.
51. Sparshott, supra note 13.
52. See EU!WTO: EU Wants to Recover Exclusive Use of its Quality Product
Names, EUR. REP., Aug. 30, 2003.
53. Skiba, supra note 2.
54. See Carricaburu, supra note 11; Webb, supra note 50. The notion that feta
is somehow uniquely a product of Greece is not unanimously accepted by EU mem-
ber nations, as Germany and Denmark would like the right to use the label. See
Cox, supra note 1; Charlotte Denny, Feta Puts Brussels in a Pickle, GUARDIAN (Lon-
don), Aug. 23, 2003, at 26.
55. See Skiba, supra note 2; Sparshott, supra note 13.
56. See Carricaburu, supra note 11; Said, supra note 2; Skiba, supra note 2;
Stokes, supra note 16; Webb, supra note 50.
57. See Cox, supra note 1.
58. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
59. See Cox, supra note 1 (discussing bologna); Skiba, supra note 2 (discussing
parmesan and mozzarella).
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educate consumers at high costs. 60 Even after those producers
incur the additional advertising costs, there is no guarantee that
they will retain all of their consumers.61 The effect on U.S. con-
sumers will also be expensive. Not only will much of the cost to
U.S. food producers be passed on to consumers, but the confu-
sion of some consumers who still want to buy products with
names they recognize might lead to those consumers to buying
more expensive products because of the narrower options. 62
In addition, the benefits to European farmers are not guar-
anteed to materialize. When Australian winemakers agreed not
to use French region names in 1994, the plan backfired on the
EU, with Australia gaining market position. 63 Similarly, it
seems unlikely that U.S. wine and cheese consumers will switch
to more expensive European products simply because of labeling
restrictions placed on the U.S. products they are used to.64
The EU, however, still considers their proposals to be im-
portant to the future vitality of their agricultural sectors and
does not seem likely to abandon the fight.65 While the United
States claims that many of these names have become generic
and that geographical labels are best protected through a
trademark system similar to the current U.S. system, the EU
counters that stronger GI protection would also help some U.S.
producers. 66 This argument has not softened the negotiating
60. See Status of the World Trade Organization, supra note 9, at 346 (state-
ment of Sarah F. Thorn, Dir. of Int'l Trade, Grocery Manufacturers of America).
This is particularly infuriating to many U.S. producers who have invested consider-
able time and energy into developing markets for product names that they might
have to surrender. See, e.g., Webb, supra note 50. One U.S. cheese spokesperson as-
serted, "If anything, our cheese plants have built the United States feta market and
[p]armesan market." Id. Rep. Bob Goodlatte, Chair of the House Agriculture Com-
mittee, argues that the popularity of parmesan cheese in the United States is "be-
cause [U.S.] dairy processors, led by Kraft, have spent tens of millions of dollars
promoting this terminology so that the vast majority of Americans would put a can
in their refrigerator." Cox, supra note 1.
61. See Cox, supra note 1.
62. See Sparshott, supra note 13.
63. See Protecting Names, supra note 16.
64. It is possible that some U.S. consumers will switch to European products as
a result of the name change of the U.S. products that they had previously been pur-
chasing. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. However, the substantial bene-
fits that European producers apparently hope for are unlikely to materialize. See
Cheesy Dispute: Taste is More Important than a Name, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Sept. 21, 2003 ("At root, we eat a food because we like the taste, not the name.... If
a product opts for a name change, we adapt."); Protecting Names, supra note 16.
65. See Stokes, supra note 16; supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
66. See Stokes, supra note 16. For example, Napa Valley wine is a term that
[Vol. 13:2
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position of the United States,6 7 although the U.S. government
has indicated that they might be willing to entertain the restric-
tion of generic wine names in exchange for compensation. 68
II. RELEVANT U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES
A. THE AUTHORITY OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION TO LIMIT U.S.
COMPLIANCE WITH WTO OBLIGATIONS
It is a settled constitutional principle that the federal treaty
power,69 while not limited by the enumerated powers doctrine,70
is limited by express constitutional prohibitions on the federal
government. 71 In the same way that the rest of the federal gov-
ernment's powers are limited by the express provisions of the
Constitution, it follows that the treaty power would be no excep-
tion. As Justice Black, writing for a plurality of the Supreme
Court put it, "[n]o agreement with a foreign nation can confer
power on... any ... branch of Government, which is free from
the restraints in the Constitution. 72
some U.S. producers would probably like protected. Id. The Napa Valley label is
already getting "ripped off' by a Beijing winery which is attempting to trademark a
label that is suspiciously similar to "Napa Valley." See Carol Emert, Chinese Use of
'Napa Valley'on Wine Draws protest in U.S., S.F. CHRON., Aug. 7, 2003, at D2.
67. See Said, supra note 2 ("American opposition is so vehement that it's
unlikely negotiators will agree to the EU proposal.").
68. See Status of the World Trade Organization, supra note 9, at 350 (state-
ment of Jon Dudas, Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property)
("[T]he U.S. government is working closely with our wine industry to reach a negoti-
ated settlement that would adequately compensate U.S. wineries in return for vol-
untarily giving up the use of generic wine terms the EU claims as its own.").
69. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
70. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
71. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
276 (2d ed. 2002) ("Treaties, of course, cannot violate the supreme law which is the
Constitution.").
72. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957) (Black, J., plurality). Looking to the
text of the Constitution, it is instructive to examine the Supremacy Clause, which
reads:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made
in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land;
and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Con-
stitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI. As Justice Black suggested, it is difficult to understand how
any treaty agreement, if it requires the United States government to do something
20041
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
One prominent academic voice has recently written that in-
ternational treaty obligations might trump competing U.S. Con-
stitutional claims. 73 However, most academic commentators
agree that Justice Black's proclamation in Reid v. Covert is the
settled legal doctrine. 74 Thus it seems relatively clear as a mat-
ter of United States law that an express constitutional limita-
tion on the power of the U.S. government, such as the First
Amendment, would prevail against an obligation of the U.S.
government under an international agreement.
B. FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS ON THE POWER OF THE
UNITED STATES TO PREVENT NON-MISLEADING USE OF GENERIC
GEOGRAPHIC LABELS
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides
that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech." 75 These ten relatively straightforward words, however,
have created some very complex legal rules, especially as re-
gards any speech that the U.S. Supreme Court has determined
to be "commercial speech."76
The Supreme Court has never heard a case that required it
to define the free speech limitations on federal government
regulation of GIs. The closest the Court has come to deciding
this question was in the 1987 case San Francisco Arts & Athlet-
ics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Committee.7 7 In that case, the Court
decided whether a statutory provision that gave the U.S. Olym-
pic Committee (USOC) the authority to prohibit unauthorized
use of the term "Olympic" even if the USOC was not able to
show that the unauthorized use was misleading.7 8 The Court
that is expressly outside the authority of the United States, could be considered to
be "made ... under the authority of the United States." Covert, 354 U.S. at 16.
73. See Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, International Law, and Constitutional Rights,
55 STAN. L. REV. 1999 (2003) [hereinafter Spiro, Treaties]; Peter J. Spiro, Globaliza-
tion and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649 (2002).
74. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 71; Stanley E. Cox, "Could a Treaty Trump
Supreme Court Jurisdictional Doctrine?'" Why Properly Construed Due Process Lim-
its Must Always Trump Contrary Treaty Provisions, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1177, 1177-78
(1998); Russell J. Weintraub, "Could a Treaty Trump Supreme Court Jurisdictional
Doctrine?': Negotiating the Tort Long-Arm Provisions of the Judgments Convention,
61 ALB. L. REV. 1269, 1276-77 (1998).
75. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
76. See infra notes 87-104 and accompanying text.
77. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
78. Id. at 527.
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held that this statute did not violate the First Amendment. 79
San Francisco Arts and Athletics, Inc. argued that because
the term "Olympic" was a generic term, the First Amendment
prevented Congress from extending a trademark on that term.80
The Court, however, said that it did not have to reach the ques-
tion whether the First Amendment ever allows Congress to
grant exclusive use of a generic word, because there were
unique reasons Congress could decide that "Olympic" was a
word that should be reserved for the USOC.s1 "Congress rea-
sonably could conclude that the commercial and promotional
value of the word 'Olympic' was the product of the U.S.O.C.'s
own talents and energy, the end result of much time, effort, and
expense."8 2
In dealing specifically with the First Amendment question,
the Court then said that the statute is simply a restriction on
the manner of expression, not on the content of expression, and
as such should only be subject to an intermediate level of scru-
tiny.8 3 Alternatively, the Court suggested in a footnote that the
statute should be analyzed as a restriction on commercial
speech, which the Court then acknowledged would require ap-
plication of a nearly identical test.8 4 The court then decided
79. Id. at 528.
80. Id. at 531-32.
81. Id. at 532.
82. S.F. Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 532-33
(1987).
This Court has recognized that words are not always fungible, and that the
suppression of particular words "run[s] a substantial risk of suppressing
ideas in the process." The SFAA argues that this principle prohibits Con-
gress from granting the USOC exclusive control of uses of the word "Olym-
pic," a word that the SFAA views as generic. Yet this recognition always
has been balanced against the principle that when a word acquires value
"as the result of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and
money" by an entity, that entity constitutionally may obtain a limited
property right in the word.
Id. at 532.
83. Id. at 536-37. "The restrictions on expressive speech properly are charac-
terized as incidental to the primary congressional purpose of encouraging and re-
warding the USOC's activities. The appropriate inquiry is thus whether the inciden-
tal restrictions on First Amendment freedoms are greater than necessary to further
a substantial governmental interest." Id. (citing U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968)).
84. 483 U.S. 522, 537 n.16 (1987).
A restriction on nonmisleading commercial speech may be justified if the
government's interest in the restriction is substantial, directly advances
the government's asserted interest, and is no more extensive than neces-
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that Congress did have a substantial interest in promoting the
interests of the USOC because of the public good that the USOC
provides, and that the statute in question did not restrict First
Amendment freedoms any more than needed to further those in-
terests.8 5
While the Court did not define just how far the First
Amendment protections extended in this case, it is clear that
there are some First Amendment limits to the power of the fed-
eral government to grant exclusive use of a term to a specific
group if use of that term by someone else would not be mislead-
ing. While SFAA dealt specifically with trademark regulation,
there is no discernible Constitutional difference between the
speech restrictions that are created by regulations of trade-
marks as opposed to GIs.
Since SFAA, more academic attention has been paid to the
question of free speech limitations on intellectual property pro-
tections.8 6 In addition, there has been considerable question
about the continuing validity of the commercial speech doctrine
that extends less protection to profit-seeking speech than to
other types of speech.87 In the 1980 case Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York88 the
Supreme Court articulated a four-part test to determine the
constitutionality of commercial speech regulation. First, the
court determines whether the speech concerns lawful activity
and is non-misleading.8 9 Second, the court must ask whether
sary to serve the interest. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). Both this test and
the test for a time, place, or manner restriction under O'Brien require a
balance between the governmental interest and the magnitude of the
speech restriction. Because their application to these facts is substantially
similar, they will be discussed together.
Id.
85. Id. at 537-39.
86. Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 690 (1993); See
Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellec-
tual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech
and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bart.
nicki, 40 HOUs. L. R. 697 (2003).
87. See Mitchell N. Berman, Commercial Speech and the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine: A Second Look at "The Greater Includes the Lesser," 55 VAND.
L. REV. 693, 701 (2002) ("[The prevailing view today.., is that the Court's commer-
cial speech jurisprudence is confused and unstable.").
88. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
89. Id. at 564.
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the government is asserting a substantial interest.90 Third, the
court determines whether the regulation directly advances that
substantial governmental interest.91 Finally, the court asks
whether the regulation is any more extensive than necessary to
serve that interest.92
This Central Hudson test remains more or less the doctrine
of commercial speech. In 1989, the Supreme Court lowered the
level of scrutiny by deciding that the least restrictive means test
in the fourth prong created too high a burden for the state to
meet.93 Instead, the Court decided that the state regulation
only needed to use "a means narrowly tailored to achieve the de-
sired objective."94 In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,95 just
seven years later, the Supreme Court appeared to move towards
even greater protection of commercial speech than provided for
in Central Hudson.96 Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ken-
nedy and Ginsburg, suggested that when a state restricts truth-
ful, non-misleading commercial speech, it should be subject to
strict scrutiny.97 Justice Thomas argued that such restrictions
would be unconstitutional per se.98 Justice Scalia, while not
joining the Thomas opinion, indicated that he agreed with Jus-
tice Thomas's analysis and had doubts about the Central Hud-
son test.9 9 In addition, the Court seems to have determined that
"a speech regulation passed with the purpose of keeping con-
sumers ignorant is per se invalid, because it lacks a legitimate
purpose, even if the government's ultimate objective is to dis-
courage or control activity that it concededly has the power to
regulate."0 0
More recently, in a 2001 case, the Court used the Central
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Bd. of Tr. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989).
94. Id. at 480.
95. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
96. See SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & JOSEPH P. TOMAIN, REGULATORY LAW AND
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 467 (3d ed. 2003).
97. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 501 (Stevens, J., plurality); SHAPIRO &
TOMAIN, supra note 96, at 467.
98. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 518-20 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); SHAPIRO & TOMAIN, supra note 96, at 467.
99. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 518-20 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 71, at 1052.
100. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L.
REV. 297, 328 (1997).
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Hudson test to strike down laws in Massachusetts regulating
tobacco advertising.10 1 Although the Court was urged to subject
the regulations to strict scrutiny, Justice O'Connor wrote for the
Court that strict scrutiny was not necessary in this case because
the regulations failed under the lower level of scrutiny provided
under the Central Hudson analysis.10 2 Justice O'Connor con-
ceded, however, that several members of the Supreme Court
had called the Central Hudson test into question. 103 One of
those members, Justice Thomas, took this opportunity to once
again call for the abandonment of Central Hudson in favor of
strict scrutiny for restrictions of commercial speech.104
The Court, once again led by Justice O'Connor, similarly
applied the Central Hudson test without determining whether a
stricter standard of review was appropriate in a 2002 case in
which the Court struck down prohibitions on advertising and
promotion of certain compounded drugs. 10 5 Justice Thomas once
again took the opportunity to concur separately and express his
belief that Central Hudson did not go far enough in protecting
non-misleading commercial speech. 106
Thus, while it is not clear precisely which level of scrutiny
federal regulation of GIs would have to satisfy, it is relatively
clear that at a minimum, the regulation would have to satisfy
the Central Hudson test as it was modified by Fox, meaning
that the government regulation must be narrowly tailored and
substantially related to achieving an important government
purpose. 107 In addition, the Court has pointed out that "the
party seeking to uphold a restriction on commercial speech car-
ries the burden of justifying it."108
101. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
102. Id. at 554-55.
103. Id. at 554.
104. Id. at 572 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
105. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002). The majority in this
case inexplicably reverts back to the least restrictive means test that had been re-
jected in Fox. See id. at 367; supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. Justice
O'Connor herself wrote that the least restrictive means test had been abandoned in
her majority opinion in Lorillard the previous year. See 533 U.S 525, 556 (2001). It
is unlikely that this means, however, that the Court has decided to revive the least
restrictive means test. A more likely explanation is that the opinion writer simply
quoted Central Hudson and overlooked the later cases modifying the test.
106. 535 U.S. at 377 (Thomas, J., concurring).
107. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 71, at 1050.
108. Western States, 535 U.S. at 373 (2002).
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III. DETERMINING THE CONTOURS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF "BOLOGNA,"
"PARMESAN," AND OTHER GENERIC TERMS
A. SUPREMACY OF THE U. S. CONSTITUTION OVER U.S.
OBLIGATIONS UNDER WTO AGREEMENTS
As a general rule, the U.S. Constitution is the supreme law
that no treaty obligations can trump. 109 There seems to be little
question that U.S. courts would prevent the U.S. government
from taking actions that are prohibited by the U.S. Constitution
simply because international agreements tell the United States
to do so. 110
With respect to the specific context of the WTO agreements,
this question becomes even clearer. The WTO agreements
themselves seem to assert their own legal supremacy over con-
flicting national laws.' However, the statute passed by Con-
gress that put the WTO agreements into legal force very clearly
indicates that U.S. law prevails in any conflict with a provision
of the WTO agreements.1 1 2 Thus it is critical to ask prior to any
109. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
110. However, U.S. courts might be tempted, as they have been in the past, to
alter their constitutional analysis to take into account international attitudes. Jus-
tice Sandra Day O'Connor recently gave an address in which she explicitly endorsed
a trend by the courts towards "rely[ing] increasingly on international and foreign
law in resolving what now appear to be domestic issues." Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor, Remarks at the Southern Center for International Studies (Oct. 28, 2003)
(transcript available at http://www.southerncenter.org/OConnor-transcript.pdf) (last
visited Nov. 14, 2003). The two examples Justice O'Connor points to, Atkins v. Vir-
ginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) and Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003), are both
instances in which individuals were protected against government power. Id. at 2.
Of course, there is no reason to believe that such international considerations could
not similarly be used to restrict individual rights and enlarge government power.
See Spiro, Treaties, supra note 73, at 2007-10 (citing the historical examples of ex-
tradition agreements, foreign claims settlement agreements, and consular courts to
demonstrate that historically courts have applied constitutional doctrines to limit
individual rights when international considerations might be served by doing so).
But if the courts were to rely on international law to resolve the constitutional dis-
pute that would arise from the EU's proposals discussed here, it would seriously
challenge the settled Reid v. Covert doctrine. See infra notes 143-47, 161-63 and ac-
companying text.
111. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
Art. XVI, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULT OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M.
23 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/04-wto.pdf (last
visited Oct. 15, 2003).
112. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 102 (a)(1), 108
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amendments to the WTO agreements, whether those amend-
ments would require the U.S. government to act in a way that
would be in violation of the U.S. Constitution.
B. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF THE EU PROPOSALS
1. The Proper Standard of First Amendment Review
All three of the EU proposals attempt, in some way, to pre-
vent certain actors from speaking in certain ways. 113 In other
words, they would require the U.S. government to engage in
prior restraint of speech, which is ordinarily viewed as inher-
ently suspect. 114 It would not be fair to characterize the regula-
tions as "mere time, manner and place restrictions," which are
more likely to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 115 Unlike time,
manner, or place restrictions, the EU proposals are designed to
prevent any expression of the desired idea, at every time, in
every manner, and in every place. 116 In addition, time, manner
and place restrictions are by definition not content-based. 117
The prohibition of the use of certain words to describe certain
products, however, must be regarded as content-based.
Stat. 4809, 4815 (1994).
113. Although this observation seems obvious, the shocking absence of any dis-
cussion of First Amendment principles in the debate over these proposals suggests
that at least some U.S. trade negotiators have overlooked this aspect of the problem.
However, there is no reason to believe that the use of certain words on product la-
bels is devoid of First Amendment protection. One federal district court, in striking
down a Congressional statute, explicitly held that such labels are extended First
Amendment protection. See Hornell Brewing Co., Inc. v. Brady, 819 F.Supp. 1227
(E.D.N.Y. 1993). There Congress prohibited the use of the term "Crazy Horse" on
any label for an alcoholic product, and the court, in striking down the legislation,
held, "The Crazy Horse Malt Liquor label is indisputably commercial speech." Id. at
1233. Earlier, the Tenth Circuit had held, "Product labels, which are part of a firm's
marketing plan to provide certain information to the consumer. . . constitute com-
mercial speech." Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady, 944 F.2d 1543, 1546 (10th Cir. 1991).
This decision was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court and affirmed. Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995). However, the specific question about whether la-
bels constitute commercial speech was not even the subject of challenge at the Su-
preme Court, which suggests that this proposition is too settled for the Solicitor
General's office to waste its time with it. See id. at 481 ("Both parties agree that the
information on beer labels constitutes commercial speech.").
114. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 86, at 222.
115. See Volokh, supra note 86, at 701-10.
116. See id. at 709-10; supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
117. See Volokh, supra note 86, at 701-03.
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Ordinarily, strict scrutiny would be applied to content-
based prior restraint of speech; however, this is where the com-
mercial speech doctrine comes into play. Commercial speech
has long been held to be a less protected type of speech.118 Al-
though there has been some question recently about what the
precise definition of commercial speech is, it is difficult to con-
ceive of a persuasive argument why a label to identify a food
product that one is selling for commercial gain would not be
commercial speech.
Of course, commercial speech is not entirely without consti-
tutional protection. To the extent that commercial speech is
non-misleading and not related to illegal activity, the Supreme
Court has recognized that it is protected against unreasonable
government regulation.1 1 9 The precise extent of this protection
is currently unclear, but at the minimum, regulation of non-
misleading commercial speech must satisfy the test established
in Central Hudson and its progeny to withstand First Amend-
ment scrutiny. 20
Whether a particular label is misleading would require a
specific factual determination about each specific product. If a
term that the EU considers to be a "geographical indication"
does not actually conjure up notions of a particular geographic
region in the minds of most U.S. consumers, then the use of that
term for products that are not from that geographical region
would not be misleading. For example, most U.S. consumers do
not expect their Kraft Parmesan Cheese to be from the Parma
region of Italy and they certainly do not think that the bologna
with a first name gets "its most important name" because it is
from Bologna, Italy.12' Thus, if the U.S. government were to
prohibit Kraft or Oscar Meyer from using these words to de-
scribe food that does not come from the preferred region of Italy
it would be engaged in regulation of non-misleading commercial
speech.
2. Application of the Central Hudson Doctrine to the EU
Proposals
When the Supreme Court has recently applied the Central
118. See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 87-108 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 1, 10-13 and accompanying text.
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Hudson test, they have declared that restrictions of non-
misleading commercial speech must be narrowly tailored and
substantially related to achieving an important government
purpose. 122 Application of this test to the regulations needed to
comply with the EU proposals on stronger GI protections re-
quires us to posit possible government interests that the U.S.
government could assert. Four possible interests are: (1) the in-.
terest in protecting consumers from being misled; (2) the inter-
est in protecting European farmers who live in preferred regions
(and potentially some U.S. farmers if acceptance of the EU pro-
posal results in protection of U.S. GIs); (3) the interest in com-
plying with international agreements; and (4) the interest in
maintaining strong international relations with European allies.
Each of these potential interests will be explored in depth.
a. Protecting Consumers as a Government Interest
The government could potentially argue that they have an
interest in protecting consumers from buying lower quality
goods without realizing it. This is part of the rationale for-
warded by the EU for these new protections. 123 However, this
interest would only be relevant to the extent that the label was
a bona fide GI in the eyes of the average U.S. consumer. If the
label in question is a generic label, use of that label to describe a
product that was not from a particular region would not be mis-
leading, and there would be no need to protect consumers. The
Supreme Court in Western States124 held that the government
could not assert a substantial government interest in preventing
consumer confusion if they were not able to establish that a par-
ticular advertisement was misleading. 125
In addition, even if the courts were to accept an interest in
consumer protection, the Supreme Court has dealt quite harshly
with the argument that the government could ever have an in-
terest in keeping consumers in the dark about truthful informa-
tion. 126 It is also unclear whether the EU proposals would be
122. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
124. 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
125. See id. at 376.
126. See id. at 374 ("We have previously rejected the notion that the Govern-
ment has an interest in preventing the dissemination of truthful commercial infor-
mation in order to prevent members of the public from making bad decisions with
the information."); supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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"substantially related" and "narrowly tailored" to achieve the
goal of consumer protection. Even if one were to concede the
possibility of some consumer confusion, the prohibition of all use
of certain words to describe all products that are not from cer-
tain areas is far from a narrowly tailored solution. Other much
less burdensome means could be used to advance this interest,
such as additional speech warning consumers about the differ-
ence between, for instance, Kraft Parmesan Cheese and Par-
migiano Reggiano from Italy. Additionally, the government
could serve this interest by requiring some clear indication of
the true origin of the product, a solution specifically rejected by
the EU proposals. 127 The Court stated in Western States, "If the
First Amendment means anything, it means that regulating
speech must be a last-not first-resort."128 With the presence
of these other methods of serving the interest of preventing con-
sumer confusion, it is unlikely that the EU proposals would sur-
vive First Amendment scrutiny on the strength of this interest.
b. Protecting European (or U.S.) Farmers as a Government
Interest
The government could assert that they have a substantial
interest in helping European agricultural producers compete in
the global market. They could also assert that agreeing to the
EU proposals would eventually help certain U.S. producers by
allowing for some GI protection of U.S. geographic labels. This
asserted interest, however, raises important questions about
what constitutes a substantial government interest or even a le-
gitimate interest. So far, the courts have failed to establish
clear, comprehensive principles about what is and is not an ac-
ceptable governmental interest.129 However, they have indi-
cated that some governmental interests are never legitimate.
There are three reasons to believe that this interest would not
be regarded as a legitimate governmental interest. First, the
government's interest in keeping consumers ignorant of infor-
mation about legal activity is never legitimate, even if it serves
a legitimate secondary governmental purpose. 130 Second, the
government can never assert an interest in censoring certain
127. See supra notes 35-38, 46 and accompanying text.
128. 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002).
129. See Bhagwat, supra note 100, at 299 ("[The Court has not tied its review of
purpose to any firm set of principles.").
130. See supra notes 100, 126 and accompanying text.
20041
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
speech simply because a particular group, in this case European
farmers, has a problem with the content of that speech. 13 1 Fi-
nally, the Court has suggested, in the equal protection context,
that the legislative purpose of preferring one politically favored
group to a politically disfavored group is not an acceptable pur-
pose. 132
Without another asserted interest besides the desire to fa-
vor some producers over others based simply on their geo-
graphical location, it is difficult to see how the regulations that
the United States would have to implement would be able to
pass First Amendment muster. The interest in favoring some
producers over others, by itself, would likely be viewed by the
Court as illegitimate. However, even if it was not, the Court has
not found any legitimate purpose for the suppression of truthful
information about lawful commercial activity simply because it
might lead to consumers making choices that the government
does not like. 133 In this case, U.S. courts faithfully following the
precedent of the Supreme Court would have to determine that
the government's interest in suppressing the use of non-
misleading labels in order to prevent consumers from choosing
to buy the products of producers from certain disfavored geo-
graphical regions is not a legitimate governmental interest,
much less an important interest.
The government might attempt to characterize this interest
in a way that escapes the problem of arbitrarily preferring one
politically favored group to a less favored one. They could as-
sert, for example, that they are protecting the investment that
the European regions have made in establishing and promoting
the particular labels. 134 This claim, however, requires accep-
tance of another claim: that the value of the labels in the United
States is substantially related to some work that particular
Europeans have done to promote those labels in the U.S. mar-
131. See, e.g., Hornell Brewing Co., Inc. v. Brady, 819 F.Supp. 1227, 1234-35
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that the fact that the name "Crazy Horse Malt Liquor" was
offensive to a substantial amount of Native Americans did not give rise to a substan-
tial governmental interest in regulating that speech).
132. See Bhagwat, supra note 100 at 327. Bhagwat argues, "[Tihe legitimacy of
governmental purposes varies with the right at issue-meaning that a particular
government purpose might be entirely legitimate when one right is being burdened,
and yet illegitimate in another context." Id. at 331.
133. See supra note 126.
134. This is similar to the rationale used in SFAA to justify the reservation of
the term "Olympic" to the USOC. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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ket. This is a factual inquiry related to whether the label in
question is a generic label1 35 and the burden of proof is on "the
party seeking to uphold [the] restriction on commercial
speech."136  The broad factual study that would be needed to
support this claim has not been attempted to this point, and it is
at best questionable that such a study would determine that all
of the labels that the EU would like protected 137 are in fact la-
bels that have value in the U.S. marketplace as a substantial
result of European marketing efforts.138
However, even if the courts were to accept this as not only a
legitimate governmental interest, but also a substantial one,
they would likely determine that the regulations in question
were not narrowly tailored and did not directly promote the in-
terest in question. 139 There are significant questions about
whether GI restrictions would substantially help European
farmers. 140 In addition, if the government were really interested
in helping European agricultural producers, there could be other
methods of helping them, such as preferential trade policies or
U.S. government purchases of European products. 41 Because
restrictions of commercial speech need to be "the last resort,"142
it is unlikely that the EU proposals would satisfy any part of the
Central Hudson test using this asserted governmental interest.
c. WTO Agreement Compliance as a Government Interest
If these proposals became part of the WTO Agreements, the
government could argue that they have a substantial interest in
complying with the WTO Agreements, and that regulation to
comply with the Agreements would be narrowly tailored and
substantially related to achieving that purpose. If we assume
that U.S. laws only went as far as the EU proposals require
135. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. These inquiries are related be-
cause the association (or lack thereof) in the minds of the average U.S. consumer
between a food label and the corresponding geographical region would serve as evi-
dence for or against such an effort to promote the connection.
136. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
137. See WTO Talks, supra note 49.
138. See supra note 60.
139. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. Although these suggestions
might seem to be a bit far-fetched, they become less so in light of the Court's First
Amendment emphasis on finding solutions that do not burden speech.
142. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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them to, it would be difficult to argue that the laws were not
narrowly tailored and substantially related to the purpose of
complying with the WTO Agreements.
The critical inquiry, then, must focus on whether the inter-
est in complying with an international agreement can, by itself,
be a substantial governmental interest that can overcome ex-
press constitutional limitations on government action. 143 This is
a question that the courts have not directly addressed. 144 How-
ever, if the courts are to take seriously the principle that inter-
national agreements cannot trump constitutional guarantees, 145
there can only be one right answer to this question. 146 If the in-
terest in compliance alone is a substantial governmental inter-
est, this potentially creates an exception that swallows the Reid
v. Covert rule. 147 This would create a situation in which the
143. See Spiro, Treaties, supra note 73, at 2019-21.
144. While the Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue, the Court
has suggested, without deciding, that compliance with international law could be a
compelling governmental interest. See Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988);
Spiro, Treaties, supra note 73, at 2019-20.
145. See supra notes 69-74, 109-12 and accompanying text.
146. Professor Spiro does not think the answer is quite so clear-cut, primarily
because he does not take the principle that seriously. While he argues that the use
of treaty compliance as a governmental interest would ultimately fail as a doctrinal
tool to challenge the supremacy of domestic constitutional rights, see infra note 147,
he continues to search for a legal basis to do so. Spiro's solution is based on a trend
he calls the constitutionalization of international law. See Spiro, Treaties, supra
note 73, at 2001-02, 2021-25. He points out that "[flights have become a part of the
international law landscape to the point that they have been constitutionalized," and
suggests this "may supply a new basis for ceding domestic constitutional autonomy."
Id. at 2021. As a result of what he calls a "rights floor" in international law, Spiro
argues, "the prospect of ceding rights autonomy should be less alarming." Id. at
2022.
Spiro's defense of the international constitutional order, however, leaves
much to be desired. First, he is so worried about answering the objections that he
fails to offer any substantive advantages to prioritizing international rights deter-
minations. Aside from amorphous claims about living in an international commu-
nity, Spiro provides virtually no affirmative reason to prefer protection of rights
through international mechanisms. See id. at 2023-25. Second, he admits that we
are locked in a domestic constitutional order that asserts legal supremacy over in-
ternational treaty obligations. See supra notes 69-74, 109-12 and accompanying
text. That constitutional order provides very limited and difficult means for altera-
tions or escape. See U.S. CONST. art. V. This situation requires more than simply
wishing for a different system. It requires some basis within our current constitu-
tional system to prioritize the determination of substantive rights at the interna-
tional level rather than the national level. Spiro does not attempt any such justifi-
cation other than pointing out isolated occasions in which courts have been
influenced by international considerations. See supra note 110.
147. See supra notes 69-74, 109-12 and accompanying text. Professor Spiro
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U.S. government could freely infringe on any constitutional pro-
tection simply by finding another country that would make an
international agreement that infringed on that protection, and
then agree to penalties for breach of that agreement that were
sufficiently severe that a court would find that the interest in
compliance was either substantial or compelling, depending on
the level of scrutiny that the regulation was subject to. 148
In addition, even if treaty compliance was regarded as an
otherwise legitimate purpose, the courts might determine that it
still does not escape the general rule that "a speech regulation
passed with the purpose of keeping consumers ignorant is per se
invalid, because it lacks a legitimate purpose, even if the gov-
ernment's ultimate objective is to discourage or control activity
that it concededly has the power to regulate."149 The per se in-
validity of keeping consumers ignorant could very well extend to
the desire to keep consumers ignorant simply to comply with the
terms of an international agreement. If so, this interest would
also fail, under the Central Hudson test, to justify the regula-
tions required by the EU proposals.
d. International Relations as a Government Interest
The government could argue that they have a substantial
agrees that "[i]f such accommodation were to occur.., the Covert rule emerges as
less categorical than the conventional account suggests." Spiro, Treaties, supra note
73, at 2020. After all, "Constitutional rights 'adjusted' by treaty norms are changed
by them. The Constitution is read to conform with the treaty." Id.
Professor Spiro ultimately rejects this rationale as a sustainable doctrinal basis for
submerging domestic constitutional rights to international law norms. Id. at 2020-
21. He argues that the stakes of treaty compliance (or non-compliance) are no
longer high enough to justify treaty compliance as a sufficiently important interest
to trump important individual rights. Id.
148. Perhaps the greatest weakness in Professor Spiro's argument is his blind
faith that something like this would not happen in a world with weakened domestic
constitutional protections. See supra note 146 (discussing Spiro's faith in an inter-
national constitutional order). However, even if he is correct that individual rights
would be protected, but simply with a different determination of the precise limits of
those rights, that still creates serious concerns. See supra note 146. We can never be
entirely sure that any decision-maker, domestic or international, will be correct in
making constitutional determinations about rights. However, at least at the na-
tional level, the possibility of comparative analysis makes correction easier. Addi-
tionally, the fact that rights determinations are made at a more local level and for a
smaller community makes the likelihood of those determinations becoming wildly
out of touch with the attitudes of a particular community less likely.
149. Bhagwat, supra note 100, at 328; see supra note 126 and accompanying
text.
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interest in maintaining good trade relations with the EU, and
thus to comply with their demands about commercial speech,
regulation is sufficiently necessary and narrowly tailored to
overcome First Amendment scrutiny. The asserted interest it-
self seems fairly reasonable. Certainly strong ties between the
United States and the EU are important, and it is conceivable
that the courts would determine that a substantial governmen-
tal interest exists. 15 0
However, the remainder of the Central Hudson test would
pose serious problems to this line of reasoning. The Court has
held that the burden of justification rests on the Government
and regulation of commercial speech must be the "last resort."151
That sets a fairly high bar that must be met in showing that
strong U.S.-EU relations could not be maintained without these
speech restrictions. Deciding whether such a finding would be
made at some future time is impossible right now, but it is diffi-
cult to imagine the circumstances under which it could be shown
that all other options in saving diplomatic and trade relations
had been exhausted before the United States agreed to restrict
commercial speech.
To overcome this burden, the U.S. government would have
to demonstrate that the EU could actually carry out any threat-
ened damage to relations. This is a dubious proposition, how-
ever, given the dependence of the EU on trade with the United
States. 152 The experience of the banana trade wars of 2000, in
which the United States was able to escalate threatened tariffs
until the EU backed down, demonstrates that total capitulation
to any particular EU demand is not necessarily needed to main-
150. It must be noted, however, that accepting such an asserted governmental
interest for the purposes of justifying encroachments on constitutional civil liberties
threatens to create a loophole similar to that warned of regarding the "treaty com-
pliance" interest. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text. But instead of
having to actually sign a treaty or international agreement, the U.S. government
would now have to find some other government to make a significant enough threat
to justify the otherwise unconstitutional action. 'This constitutional doctrine would
have the additional drawback of having a built-in process of potential manipulation
by a party with an interest in the outcome. To return to our present case as an ex-
ample, we should be reluctant to accept a method of constitutional analysis that al-
lows the EU to increase the chances of a favorable outcome for them by virtue of
their increased recalcitrance.
151. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376 (2002).
152. See Lou Dobbs, Show Some Steel, Mr. Bush, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Nov. 24, 2003, at 48. "It may have escaped the attention of the Brussels bureau-
crats, but [the U.S.] is Europe's biggest and best customer, and the Europeans sim-
ply cannot afford the price of economic warfare." Id.
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tain a relationship with the EU. 153
C. THE AFTERMATH
In light of the constitutional problems of U.S. compliance
with the EU's claw-back proposals, one of four possible scenarios
could result from such an amendment to the WTO Agreements.
In the first scenario, all U.S. producers would just quietly accept
the agreement and decide not to raise the First Amendment ar-
guments that have been outlined here. This seems monumen-
tally unlikely given the high economic stakes for U.S. producers
and consumers 154 and the outrage of those in the United States
in response to what they perceive as ridiculous restrictions of
their ability to call products by the names they associate with
them.155
The second scenario, similarly unlikely, is that the EU
would simply allow U.S. courts to gut the enforcement of their
proposals in the United States. Given the EU's belief that such
protections are vitally important to European producers, there
is no reason to think they would give up so easily, especially af-
ter they would have already gone so far to get these protections
recognized on the international level. 156 The fact that the lack
of progress at Cancun has not deterred the EU from continuing
to advocate this proposal also strongly suggests that they would
not give up these protections very easily once they were won.157
This would leave us with a certain conflict between the in-
terests of the EU and the U.S. producers, with the U.S. federal
courts as the likely battleground. This would give rise to one of
the final two scenarios. The first possibility is that the U.S.
courts would apply commercial speech principles in the way that
the Court is now articulating them, and would strike down any
attempt by the U.S. government to comply with the EU propos-
als.158 This would put the United States in violation of explicit
WTO provisions, and would likely trigger international retalia-
tion similar to that which had been feared as a result of the
2003 WTO ruling holding U.S. steel tariffs illegal. 159 The WTO
153. See id.
154. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 11-13, 50-59 and accompanying text; supra note 60.
156. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 113-51 and accompanying text.
159. See U.S. Steel Tariffs Ruled Illegal, Sparking Potential Trade War, WALL
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Agreements do not make an allowance for superseding domestic
law obligations, and make it the responsibility of each individ-
ual country to comply. 160 As a result, the U.S. Constitution, if
faithfully applied by the Courts, would put the United States in
clear violation of international trade law.
The final scenario is no more desirable. The courts might
find some way to circumvent the relatively clear commercial
speech protections that should prevent the types of broad-
sweeping speech regulations that the EU proposes.16' This
would likely be done in a way that does not directly overturn
Reid v. Covert,162 but would leave it in shambles nonetheless. 163
Because these speech restrictions would clearly be illegal if they
were not backed by an international determination, any ration-
ale the U.S. courts would use to uphold them would likely be
fairly transparent. This would seriously call into question the
settled doctrine of Reid v. Covert that the U.S. federal govern-
ment cannot act outside the limits of the U.S. Constitution, even
when invited or ordered to do so by some international agree-
ment. Perhaps more importantly, it would signal that the
courts are willing to disregard fundamental domestic legal prin-
ciples if the international price is right. 64
CONCLUSION
U.S. constitutional free speech guarantees may create seri-
ST. J., Nov. 11, 2003, at Al.
160. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 113-51 and accompanying text.
162. Even Professor Spiro, who would not be opposed to such a development,
does not think that a direct repudiation of the doctrine of constitutional supremacy
is realistic. See Spiro, Treaties, supra note 73, at 2025-26 ("It is unlikely in the ex-
treme that the treatymakers would undertake... a frontal assault against the su-
premacy of constitutional rights given the clear lack of constitutional authorization
to constrain rights on international law grounds."),
163. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
164. Ironically, this perhaps would undermine the precise rationale that Justice
O'Connor offers for being "seen to be cognizant of other judicial systems," namely the
"ability to act as a rule-of-law model for other nations." See O'Connor, supra note
110, at 2. Justice O'Connor correctly identifies the rule of law, defined in her words
as "the notion that no person, including the sovereign, is above the law and that per-
sons will be secure from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government," as an
important ideal to which communities should aspire. Id. at 3. However, if the U.S.
courts decide that the sovereign can place itself above the law, in this case the First
Amendment, simply by entering into an international agreement that requires a vio-
lation of that law, there will not be much rule of law for anyone else to model.
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ous problems for international protections of GIs. If the EU in-
sists on demanding protections for labels that are considered
generic by U.S. consumers, it appears that they are on a colli-
sion course with our First Amendment. Conversely, the bar-
gaining position of the United States would be substantially dif-
ferent if the U.S. negotiators pointed out that the restrictions
that the EU is requesting are, at best, of questionable constitu-
tionality.
The U.S. courts have consistently held that express limita-
tions of the U.S. Constitution limit the power of the U.S. gov-
ernment even when it is acting in accordance with an interna-
tional agreement and would likely find that U.S. duties under
the WTO agreements are subordinate to the First Amendment.
They have also consistently held that the First Amendment pro-
tects non-misleading commercial speech. The precise extent of
the protection that is extended to commercial speech under the
First Amendment is not clear. However, it must be emphasized
that even under the Central Hudson test, the most deferential
test possible under current First Amendment law, the U.S. gov-
ernment would have an extremely difficult time justifying the
commercial speech restrictions that the EU is asking them to
make.
It is in the interests of all parties at the negotiating table
(or at least all parties that'are interested in making a deal that
would be enforceable in the United States) to make sure that
their proposals do not run afoul of the First Amendment. The
EU's current demands to prohibit even non-misleading use of
generic labels would likely fail that test.
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